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This paper explores three questions about the semantics of free relatives (FRs). One, 
do FRs have a uniform meaning? Two, related to one, what is  the contribution of 
ever? And three,  perhaps less discussed than the other two, what i s  the relation 
between identity andfree choice (FC) readings of FRs with ever? It  claims that FRs 
are always definite . Ever introduces a type of modality that is  independent of the 
verbal system by enforcing universal quantification over episternic alternatives to the 
world of evaluation. In so doing, it endows the FR with properties typically 
associated with universal quantifiers. There is no formal distinction between identity 
and Fe readings of FRs. The crucial distinctions have to do with the interaction of 
uniqueness requirements typical of definites, NP-internal modality and episodic vs. 
non-episodic interpretations determined by tense and aspect. 
1 . Ever FRs: Definites or Universals? 
1 . 1 .  FR 's as Definites 
1 . 1 . 1 .  The Variation in Quantification 
I will take as a starting point, the viewpoint of Jacobson ( 1 995) and Dayal ( 1 995a) 
that FRs are essentially definite descriptions. l The focal point of these investigations 
is the well-known variation between universal and definite readings of FRs. Though 
the availabil ity of a particular reading may be aided by the presence or absence of 
ever, the correlation is  not stable. As Jacobson points out, the paradigm in ( l  )-(2) 
might suggest an analysis of plain FRs as definites and ever FRs as universals ,  but 
the paradigm in  (3 )-(4) shows that it is just as easy to get the reverse readings: 
( I )  I ordered what he ordered for dessert. (=the thing h e  orderedfor dessert) 
(2) John will read whatever Bill assigns. (=everythinglanything Bill assigns) 
(3) Do what the babysitter tells you . (=evelything the babysitter tells you) 
(4) Everyone who went to whatever movie the Avon is now showing said it was 
boring. ' (=the movie the A von is now showing) 
Since it is not possible to correlate the universal/definite quantificational 
force with the morpheme ever, we need a general account of free relatives that allows 
for both readings. Jacobson does this by treating the free relative as a definite 
description denoting the unique maximal entity sati sfying the description . The 
analogy she draws is  with the analysis of regular definite descriptions proposed by 
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Sharvy ( 1 980) and Link ( 1 983) .  Noun phrases of the fonn the N indicate by the 
morphology on the common noun whether quantfication is over atoms (thereby 
ensuring absolute uniqueness) or pluralities (thereby admitting quasi-universal force). 
Free relatives lacking internal heads appear ambiguous because the morphology 
does not reveal whether maximality operates over the domain of atoms or pluralities. 
Indirect evidence for this claim comes from correlatives, structures in which 
the relative clause is  left adjoined to the main clause (Dayal 1 995a) .  Hindi 
correlatives are semantically akin to English free relatives in many respects. Most 
crucially, they display the same variation between definite and quasi-universal 
readings. Since Hindi correlatives readily allow internal heads and the verbal 
morphology is also transparent with resepct to number marking, however, they come 
out as either definite or quasi-universal, not ambiguous : 
(5)  jo  laRkii khaRii hai  vo lambii hai 
wh girl standing be Dem tall be 
"The girl who is standing is tal l ."  
(6) jo  laRkiyaaN khaRii haiN ve lambii haiN 
wh girls standing be Dem tal l be 
"The girls who are standing are tal l ."  
The relative clause can be treated as a generalized quantifier denoting the properties 
of the unique maximal individual , singular or plural , and the main clause as denoting 
a property. The two can combine by standard rules of quantification. This procedure 
for interpreting correlatives, we see, treats the relative clause as a definite description. 
S ince correlatives are semantically close to English FRs, the treatment of the relative 
clause as a definite description can be seen as extending to FRs. 
There is also direct evidence that English FRs are de finites. Jacobson pojnts 
to Carlson ( 1 98 1 ) ' s  diagnostic of modification by nearly/almost to identify true 
universals. The examples below are not exactly Jacobson' s  but make the same point: 
(7 )  a. I d id  nearly/almost everything/anything you told me to do .  
b .  I d id  *nearly/*almost whatever you told me to  do. 
Another paradigm showing that FRs with quasi-universal force al ign with 
plural de finites rather than universals was pointed out in Dayal ( l 995a) .  As (8) 
shows, negation may take wide scope over a universal but not over a definite or a FR: 
(8 )  I don't like everything/*what/*the things Sue ordered but I l ike  most ofthem . 
To sum up, whi le there are differences of detail between Jacobson ' s  analysis 
of English FRs and my analysis of Hindi correlatives and its possible extensions to 
English FRs, both take the variation between definite and universal readings as 
fundamental and propose that unique maximal individuals are at issue. In  the case 
of atoms, the requirement of uniqueness can only be satisfied if a unique individual 
satisfies the description in relative clause. In  the case of plural ities, uniqueness is 
sati sfied by the maximal individual who meets the description. The appeal of this 
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approach i s  that nothing special i s  needed to account for the variation beyond the role 
of number specification in determining the domain of quantification. 
1 . 1 .2 .  The Role of Ever 
This approach to FRs immediately raises a question about the contribution of ever. 
This was dealt with more fully in Dayal ( 1 995a) with respect to the contribution of 
the morpheme bhii in Hindi correlatives and I will briefly summarize the key points 
of my earlier analysis here. As far as I can tell, the basic ideas are compatible with 
the brief comments about the role of ever in Jacobson. 
The l iterature generally recognizes two readings of FRs with ever. The first 
I call the identity reading, the other is known as the free choice (FC) reading. I t  can 
be shown quite easily in  Hindi that the identity reading is available when bhii occurs 
in a structure that would otherwise pick out a unique referent; the Fe reading is  
avail able when the tense-aspect dilutes uniqueness requirements by imposing a 
generic interpretation.2 The English cases in ( l 0) also show the correlation between 
uniqueness and the identity reading and between genericity and the Fe reading: 
(9) a. jo bhii laRkii mehnat kar rahii hai vo safal hogii 
wh ever girl effort is  making she successfu l  will be 
"The gir l  who i s  making an effort wi l l  be succesful ."  
b.  jo  bhii laRki i  mehnat karti i  hai vo safal hot i i  hai 
wh ever girl effort does she successful be 
"Any girl who makes an effort succeeds" 
( l 0) a. Whichever movie is now playing at the Avon is  making a lot of money. 
b .  Whichever movie plays at the Avon makes a lot of money. 
The basic insight about bhii I had was that it is a polarity item . Following 
Kadmon & Landman ( 1 993), I argued that bhii in correlatives induces widening and 
is  l icensed if i t  results in strenthening. To see how this works, let us take the identity 
reading first. The version of (9a) without bhii would require there to be a unique 
individual who has the property of working hard. The addition of bhii signals that 
the identity of this individual is not known, or that the individual ' s  identity is not 
relevant . While the plain correlative can be used referentially or attributively, a bhii 
correlative can only be used attributively, in the sense of Donnel lan ( 1 966) . The 
latter applies to a wider set of individuals and constitutes a stronger statement. 
Turning to Fe readings, we see that though the morphology in (9b) i s  sti l l  
singular, the tense-aspect forces a generic interpretation. Though uniqueness i s  not 
formally rel inquished, its effects are diluted by the generic binding of a situation 
variable. That is, quantification here is over situations, each of which has a unique 
individual with the property of working hard. While a corresponding statement 
without bhii would brook some exceptions, the version with bhii has a Fe flavor 
because it suggests a reduced tolerance for such exceptions. Once again, bhii effects 
a widening and results in a stronger statement. 
I would like to note at this point that though I stil l  adhere to the intuitive 
generalizations given above, I am no longer convinced that the explanation for these 
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facts is in tenns of widening/strengthening. Considerations of space prevent me from 
discussing this in detail ,  but see Dayal ( I  995b ) for some arguments against this 
general approach to polarity l icensing. What is  of more immediate relevance here 
is that in Dayal ( l 995a) bhii impacts on the statement in two different ways, even 
though they both fall  within the umbrella of widening/strenghtening. In section 2 of 
this paper I will argue instead that the contribution of ever, and by extension of bhii, 
i s  unifonnly to indicate attributive-only readings. 
1 .2 .  FRs as Ambiguous 
The view that FRs are definites has gained currency (Rullmann ( 1 995) and Grosu and 
Landman ( 1 995), for example). At the same time, the view of FRs as ambiguous has 
been revived recently by Tredinnick ( 1 994) and latridou and Varlakosta ( 1 996) .  
They each argue that ever FRs must be recognized as bona fide universal quantifiers . 
Although this view goes back to earlier views challenged by Jacobson, some of their 
arguments are worth considering since they cannot, at least in an obvious way, be 
reconciled with a view of FRs as definites. My goal in this section is to bring out 
what I take to be the key challenges to the approach and evaluate them. In the next 
subsection I will show that these arguments cannot be handled by simply classifying 
ever FRs as universals .  The needed adjustment will be shown to follow within a 
view of FRs as definites, once the role of ever as s ignalling their attributive-only 
readings is fleshed out. 
Tredinnick points out that plain and ever FRs do not always occur in the 
same environments and takes this to argue that they are not of the same semantic 
type. I give below a few of the facts she mentions. As ( I I )  shows, a plain FR does 
not l icense a polarity item whi le one with ever does :  
( I I )  a. He got into trouble for what*(ever) he ever did to anyone. 
b .  I will go where*(ever) the hell you go. 
Although Jacobson has a few examples challenging the generalization that ever FRs 
l icense such items, ( 1 1 )  does seem representative, and to the extent that such 
licensing can be attributed to universals, it suggests that an ever FR is a universal .  
Another argument that Tredinnick gives is based on the following contrast: 
( 1 2) a. When I go to the store, I mostly buy potatoes. 
b .  Whenever I go to the store, I mostly buy potatoes. 
( 1 2a) can mean that on all occassions that I go to the store, most of what I buy are 
potatoes or it can mean that on most occassions that I go to the store, I buy potatoes .  
( 1 2b) has only the first reading. Tredinnick claims that the adverb of quantification 
cannot bind the variable of an ever FR because it is already bound by ever. 
I should point out that the possibility of a reading in which the adverb seems 
to bind the variable of the plain FR (QVE) in ( 1 2a) is not an argument against 
treating it as a definite. Although Bennan's  ( 1 99 1 )  discussion of QVE suggests that 
this may have to do with wh expressions being indefinites, the same effects are also 
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available with definites. ( 1 3a) allows for a QVE reading but ( l 3b) does not: 
( 1 3) a. John usually l ikes the student who does best in class. 
b .  John usually liked the student who did best in class. 
Clearly, definiteness i s  not antithetical to QVE, but episodicity is .  In order to 
account for QVE effects in regular definites, then, something like binding over 
situations with unique individuals would be needed and the same would apply to 
plain FRs. Tredinnick' s  data, then, does not challenge the view that plain FRs are 
definite. But it does raise the possibil i ty of ever FRs being universals .  
In additon to separating out plain and ever FRs,  Tredinnick also focuses on 
the differences between the two readings of ever FRs. The identity reading (the don 't 
know reading in her terminology) is a specific indefinite reading while the Fe 
reading is a universal. Leaving aside for the moment the status of the FC reading of 
FRs, I would l ike to point out that it is not tenable to treat the identity reading in 
terms of specific indefinites. Consider the following paradigm: 
( 1 4) a. Mary bought some thingj . [Something she bought] ' j  was expensive . 
b. Mary bought some thingj .  [Whatever she boughq was expensive. 
Though a specific indefinite may be like a definite with respect to uniqueness, i t  has 
different famil iarity requirements (Em; 1 99 1 ) . It cannot take a discourse antecedent 
whereas a FR, under its identity reading, can easily do so. If  ever FRs under their 
identity readings are definites, as ( 1 4) shows, the only challenge that remains to be 
addressed is whether ever FRs under their FC readings need to be recognized as 
universals .  Taken at face value, the facts in ( 1 1 )  and ( 1 2) seem to suggest so. 
latridou and Varlakosta ( 1 996) start from a position similar to Tredinnick ' s .  
They add an  important argument to  the position that ever FRs are universals by  
drawing attention to  the fact, noted in Jacobson, that plain FRs are acceptable in 
certain pseudocleft constructions while ever FRs are not: 
( I S) a. What( ever) Mary bought was expensive. 
b .  What(*ever) Mary bought was Barriers . 
They adopt the view in Williams ( 1 983)  and Partee ( 1 896) that in a predicational 
pseudocleft, the FR is  the functor while in a specificational pseudocleft it is the 
argument (see Higgins ( 1 973)  and, more recently, Heycock and Kroch ( 1 996) and 
Sharvit ( 1 997) for more on this distinction). The ever FR in ( 1  Sa) is acceptable 
because it is  a universal quantifier of type « e, t>t> and can take as argument the VP 
of type <e, t> .3 Turning to the paradigm in ( I Sb), they argue that the plain FR being 
of type e can serve as an argument to the VP but the ever FR being of type « e, t>t> 
cannot. As we wil l  see in section 3 ,  I&V's  analysis of the facts cannot be maintained 
in this simple form. For now, though, let us simply note that the contrast in ( I Sb) is 
not something that has a ready explanation in the approach to FRs as uniformly 
definite and needs to be taken seriously. 
These approaches revive earl ier view of FRs as ambiguous .  Larson ( 1 987) ,  
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for example, argues that ever FRs with a missing preposition are acceptable  because 
they are universal quantifiers that raise at LF and allow the reconstruction needed for 
interpretation. Plain FRs do not have this option because they are definites :4 
( 1 6) I will l ive in what*(  ever) towns you will live. 
F inally, let me add another argument against ever FRs being definites .  Recall 
the data from Dayal ( 1 995a) with respect to negation and compare it with an ever FR: 
( 1 7) a. I didn ' t  like *what/whatever Sue ordered but I l iked most of i t .  
b .  �Vx [ordered(s,x) - like(I,x)] 
It i s  easy to a get a reading like ( 1 7b) for the first conjunct with the ever FR, specially 
if whatever i s  stressed, thereby allowing the relevant continuation. This again 
suggests that ever FRs are universals while plain FRs are definites .  
In this  section we have considered some differences between plain F Rs and 
ever FRs. Though the former strongly align with definites, the latter seem to behave 
like universals .  Before probing this conclusion any further, let me emphasize a point 
often glossed over by the proponents of the ambiguity hypothesis. Taking plain and 
ever FRs as belonging to different types has the consequence that ever FRs also have 
to be treated as ambiguous; as de finites when they have identity readings, and as 
universals when they have Fe readings. This conclusion seems to me less than 
satisfactory and, as we will see, there are good reasons to reconsider it. 
1 . 3 .  Reassessing the Problem 
1 . 3 . 1 .  Fe Readings of Ever FRs and Their Definite-like Behavior 
In this subsection I wil l  argue that to ask whether an ever FR is a definite or a 
universal is to ask the wrong question. What we need to ask is why a F R  which is 
a definite can so easily acquire the properties of a universal when the morpheme ever 
is present. Note that the claim in the literature is that an ever FR is a universal when 
it can refer to a plurality of individuals. We will see though that this is neither 
sufficient nor necessary for an ever FR to acquire properties typically associated with 
universal quantifiers. I wil l  first show that FRs with Fe readings are not forced to 
behave like universals but retain the behavior of definites. I will then show that even 
those cases of ever FRs that are provably definite display behavior characteristic of 
universals .  When the ful l  evidence is considered, it becomes clear that classifying 
an ever FR as an ordinary universal simply misses the point. 
Let us begin by showing that a FR with a Fe reading is stil l  a definite. A 
crucial distinction between ever FRs, even when they refer to a plurality of 
individuals as in their Fe reading, and a regular universal quantifier with every is 
noted by Grosu and Landman ( 1 995) .  ( 1 8)-( 1 9) are fashioned after their examples:  
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( 1 8) a. Mary has read two thirds of every book in the series .  
b .  Mary has read two thirds of whatever books are in the series .  
c .  Mary has read two thirds of the books in this series.  
( 1 9) a. Mary ate only a portion of every dish she was served. 
b .  Mary ate only a portion of whatever dishes she was served. 
c .  Mary ate only a portion of the dishes served. 
( 1 8a) says that for each book in the series Mary has read two thirds of it .  Let us cal l  
this the distributed partitive reading. ( I 8b), on the other hand, i s  ambiguous. In 
addition to the distributed partitive reading it also has what we may call a collective 
partitive reading such that Mary has read two thirds of the total number of the books 
in the series. There is  no implication that Mary's reading habits are at all weird; there 
are books she stil l  has to begin because she finishes a book before she starts on the 
next one . A regular definite behaves similarly, though the collective partitive 
reading may be more salient. ( 1 9) shows a similar pattern. Suppose that Mary is 
served three dishes, ( 1 9a) requires her to eat some part of every dish served; ( 1 9b) 
is compatible with her eating a part of every dish or a part of the total i ty of dishes 
served, leaving one or two dishes untouched. Again, this is  akin to a regular definite. 
Assuming that a partitive phrase takes an individual denoting argument in 
complement position, we can conclude that a generalized quantifier would be forced 
to QR. ( 1 8a), for example, would have an LF such as (20a), and would get a 
distributed partitive interpretation, as in (20b). 5 The definite, on the other hand, 
being individual denoting can be interpreted in situ as in (2 1 a), yielding the collective 
partitive reading. Alternatively, it may QR as in (22a) where it could get the 
distributed partitive reading, under theories of distributivity, such as Link ( 1 983) :  
(20) a. [ I P Mary [vp every book in thi s  series; [vp read [NP two thirds of tJm 
b.  Vz[ [book(z) & in-this-series(z)] � [read(2/3 � z) (m)]] 
(2 1 )  a. [IP Mary[ VP read [NP two thirds of the books in this series]]]  
b .  read(2/3 � lx[*book(x) & in-this-series(x)])(m) 
(22) a .  [IP Mary [vP the books in this  series; [vP read [NP two thirds of tJm 
b .  DAz[read(2/3 � z) (m)] (lx[*bk(x) & in-this-series(x)]) 
The data in ( 1 8) and ( 1 9) show quite clearly, then, that ever FRs are definites, even 
when they refer to a plurality of indiviudals, as is the case with the FC readings here . 
1 . 3 . 2 .  Definite FRs with Ever and Their Universal-like Behavior 
Let us now tum to definite readings of ever FRs and their universal-l ike 
properties. Recall from section 1 .2 that polarity l icensing has been used as a 
diagnostic in claiming that ever FRs are universals .  It appears though that such 
l icensing is  available even when the ever FR has the interpretation of a definite. 
Consider examples parallel to ( 1 8)-( 1 9) but with a polarity item inside: 
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(23)  a .  Mary has read two thirds of whatever books were on any of her reading 
l ists. 
b .  In all her years in office Mary has approved only a fraction of whatever 
grants any of her students have submitted. 
c .  John and Mary have used most of whatever gifts they'd  got from anyone. 
Now, one might think that polarity l icensing would only be possible when the ever 
FR is interpreted as a universal but this. is not the case. (23a) allows the collective 
partitive reading. It is compatible with Mary leaving some of her readings l i sts 
wholly untouched; (23b) with Mary having some students who have been totally 
unsuccessful with grants and (23c) with guests whose gifts are not used by John and 
Mary at all .  Another way to test the availabil ity of the collective reading is to check 
for presuppositons. (23a) does not require every reading list to have more than one 
item; (23b) does not require every student to have submitted more than one 
application and perhaps most clearly, (23c) does not require each guest to have given 
more than one gift. We see that polarity items are l icensed by FRs with a FC reading 
even when they behave like definites. 
The same point can be made by taking the identity reading of ever FRs. The 
examples in (24) are taken from Tredinnick and modified to show that polarity 
l icensing is not contingent on plurality (what she calls the quantificational reading) : 
(24) a .  I ' ll go where*(ever) the hell you're going. 
b .  I ' l l  do what*(ever) the hell detectives do. 
As we saw in section 1 .2 identity readings are best analyzed as definites, rather than 
specific indefinites, because they can take discourse antecedents . The examples in 
(24) have identity readings since the most natural interpretations involve a single 
place that the hearer is expected to be going to, or a single routine that detectives are 
expected to go through. And yet, l icensing of polarity items is possible .6 
Along the same lines, Grosu ( 1 996) notes that Larson' s  examples about 
missing-P constructions are equally available with identity readings of ever FRs: 
(25) John i s  now digging with whatever tool Mary was digging a moment ago . 
If the solution to the missing-P FR requires QR of a universal term, the uniquely 
referring ever FR would also have to QR. Larson ' s  account, however, rests on QR 
being restricted to NPs with quantificational force .  
Summing up this section, the data shows that if we want to maintain the view 
that ever FRs are universals we must incorporate two properties into the definition 
of this universal . One, it should be possible to interpret it as the sum of the atoms in 
its domain and, two, we must allow singletons to constitute felicitous domains. Once 
we make these adjustments, however, we are in effect treating FRs as definites .  The 
real question that emerges is not whether FRs are definites, but why it is that the 
presence of ever results in these definites acquiring properties typically associated 
with universals .  In the next section this is the question I will try to answer. 
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2. Ever FRs as Attributive-Only Readings of Definites 
2 . 1 .  Identity Readings 
In trying to understand the contribution of ever to FRs, I will first develop an account 
of identity readings and then extend it to FC readings. This is  primarily dictated by 
practical considerations. The definite nature of the identity reading is  easier to see 
since tense-aspect specifications ensure an episodic interpretation. This cuts out the 
obfuscating effect on definiteness that the quantification needed for non-ep isodic 
interpretations has. As we wil l  see, FC readings arise when non-episodic 
interpretation combines with the basic meaning of ever evident in identity readings. 
Let us begin with an intuitive characterization of what constitutes the identity 
reading. A FR, under its identity reading, is a statement in which the assertion is not 
contingent on the particular individual picked out by the definite description. In 
terms of Donnellan ( 1 966), it i s  an attributive, not a referential statement. The 
distinction can be i l lustrated with an imperative like Throw out the man with the 
martini. As Donnellan points out, there are situations in which a description may fai l  
to pick out the intended individual and yet be  a successful assertion about that 
individual , as long as some aspect of the context makes it possible for the speaker to 
use that description to refer to that individual . This constitutes the referential use of 
the definite. So someone could use the imperative to command that John be thrown 
out even if i t  turns out that he is  actually drinking water. Under an attributive use, 
however, the command is  not about any particular individual . If the description i s  
successful the command applies to the individual who meets the description, 
otherwise the command is retracted. Attributive readings imply an essential 
connection betwen the description and the assertion. In referential readings the 
connection is tenuous. 
Whi le  the referential-attributive distinction is  well accepted, its status as a 
formal distinction has been challenged, most forcefully by Kripke ( 1 977). The claim 
I am making is  that the semantics of ever forces us to accord this distinction a bona­
fide grammatical status. Thi s  i s  essentially the claim from Dayal ( l 995a) 
summarized briefly in section 1 . 1 .2 but the actual analysis given below is different. 
As pointed out to me by Donka Farkas, a similar claim about the grammatical status 
of the referential-attributive distinction was made by her in relation to romance 
subjunctives. The analysis of attributive readings to be given here, in fact, closely 
resembles her approach to the phenomenon (see Farkas ( \ 985) and ( 1 994); see also 
Giannakidou ( \ 996)). 
The basic proposal I would l ike to make is  that a FR with ever has a modal 
dimension and is interpreted with respect to a set of alternatives to the world of 
evaluation. I call these worlds i (  dentity)-alternatives because they can differ from the 
actual world only in the denotation of the FR. The proposal in (26) adopts a 
translation language that allows explicit quantification over worlds (Gal l in 1 975) :  
(26) a. whateverj [1P . . .  tj " ' ] denotes at w = 
.l..Q Vi-alternatives E f(w)(s) [Q(i)(lx[P(i)(x)]] 
where P is the property derived by abstracting over Xj in the IP  denotation. 
1 07 
1 08 VANEETA DAYAL 
b. f(w)(s) = { W ' :  Vp[s believes pew) -pew' ) }  
for a world of evaluation w and speaker s, f(w)(s) i s  the set of worlds in 
which the speaker' s beliefs about w hold. 
c .  a world w' EO f(w)(s) is an i-alternative iff there exists some w" EO f(w)(s), 
such that lX [P(W')(x)] "# lX[P(W")(x)] 
Let me comment briefly on the key features of this proposal . (26a) has ever 
introducing a modal dimension into the interpretation. The FR denotes the set of 
properties that its referent in any relevant world has. Note that this modality is not 
tied to tense and aspect, so that the world variable w remains free. (26b) makes 
explicit that the modal base represents the speaker's  belief about w .  Assuming that 
the FR is used felicitously, every world in the set will have a unique referent for the 
FR. This follows from the standard presupposition associated with definites .7 (26c) 
makes explicit the notion of i-alternatives. It characterizes a world as an alternative 
iff it can be distinguished from another world solely on the basis of the denotation 
of the FR. Crucially, i-alternatives share temporal and other contextual parameters. 
I will illustrate how this proposal works with concrete examples. Take (27a) 
which would be interpreted as in (27b). (27c) sets out the criteria for distinguishing 
i-alternatives. In contrast, the plain FR in (28a) would be interpreted as in  (28b). 
The possible denotations for the FR here is the same set of entities that forms the 
basis for the i-alternatives in (27c), namely ratatouille, lentils and goulash: 
(27) a. Mary is  cooking something. Whatever she is cooking uses onions. 
b .  Vi-alt EO f(w)(s)[uses-onions(i)(lx [cooking(i)(x)(m)])] 
c. i-alt , :  lx [cooking(i)(x)(m)] = ratatouille 
i-alt2 : lx[cooking(i)(x)(m)] = lentils 
i-alt) : lx [cooking(i)(x)(m)] = goulash 
(28)  a .  What M ary is  cooking uses onions 
b. uses-onions(w)(lx[cooking(w)(x)(m)]) 
(27b) says that as far as the speaker is concerned, in all the relevant i-alternatives at 
w, the dish being cooked by Mary uses onions. Or more colloquially, the speaker 
intends the assertion to hold regardless of the identity of the dish. The assertoric 
force is therefore attributive. Property Q holds of the entity by virtue of its meeting 
description P, there is an essential connection between them. (28a) also lends itself 
to such an interpretation. But in addition it allows for an interpretation in which the 
relation between P and Q is accidental. That is, the assertion can be based on beliefs 
about a particular entity. The description is simply an expedient way of referring to 
it. To see this, take three different contexts in which (27a) or (27b) could be uttered. 
Suppose the speaker has no idea about what Mary is  cooking but he sees her 
chop onions. He can utter either (27a) or (28a). Suppose, now, that the speaker can 
see the dish being prepared, knows all the ingredients being put in (including onions) 
but doesn't know the name of the dish. He can still use either sentence. But 
suppose, instead, that the speaker not only knows how the dish is being prepared, he 
also knows its name. In such a situation only (28a) i s  appropriate . This becomes 
evident if a parenthetical identifying the object is added: 
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(29) a. * Whatever Mary is cooking, namely ratatouille, uses onions. 
b .  What Mary is  cooking, namely ratatouille, uses onions. 
The proposed difference between plain and ever FRs accounts for these facts. 
The definition of i-alternative in (26c) requires that there be at least two worlds, 
distinguishable on the basis of the denotation ofthe FR. That is, as far as the speaker 
is concerned, the identity of the object denoted by the FR should still be open. For 
if  the speaker has a belief about the identity of the unique relevant individual, there 
cannot be two worlds in f(w)(s) that will qualify as i-alternatives .  The ever FR will  
be infel icitous because quantification will be over an empty domain.  There is  
obviously no such problem with plain FRs. 
I should point out that the particular modality involved here leaves room for 
exceptions. For example, if  the speaker believes, maybe erroneously, that Mary i s  
a strict vegetarian who would not touch meat, worlds in  which Mary cooks goulash 
will not be in f(w)(s). So the speaker might assert I will eat whatever Mary is 
cooking without any intention of eating meat. The use of the ever FR would stil l  be 
fel icitous because there is a possibility of distinguishing i-alternatives on the basis 
of other dishes. Truth will be verified with respect to only these dishes. Obviously, 
the set of relevant worlds varies with speakers and therefore the fel icity of an ever FR 
is not fixed for a world, but for a world and a speaker. 
A consequence of this approach is that the fel icitous use of an ever FR is 
predicted to be very sensitive to context. Consider, for example, appositive uses of 
ever FRs with names and demonstratives, two canonical types of referential terms :  
(30)  a .  Throw out that man, whoever he is .  
b. Throw out John Smith, whoever he is .  
c .  Throw out that man, John Smith, whoever he is .  
In (30a),  an individual i s  identified by demonstration and the ever statement is  
acceptable because i t  i s  possible to distinguish a set  of i-alternatives by varying the 
identity of the individual picked out. In (30b), the name John Smith is used 
attributively and a set of i-alternatives can be derived by assigning different 
individuals as referent of the name. 8 (30c) is interesting. It involves a combination 
of demonstration and naming and, if presented out of the blue, appears unacceptable. 
This is  presumably because there is no criteria for separating i -alternatives. As 
pointed out by David Beaver (p .c . ) ,  however, there are contexts where (30c) could 
be used felicitously. For example, the speaker seeing someone at a conference with 
a name tag John Smith but not knowing anything about this individual , might utter 
(30c). But note that in this context, the speaker' s  lack of sufficient knowledge about 
this individual ' s  properties can provide the basis for individuating i-alternatives . 
To sum up, though I have classified the ever FR as an attributive-only term, 
we have seen that it is compatible with referential terms as long as some possibil ity 
for varying the denotation of the FR remains. We can thus think of the contribution 
of ever as forcing some amount of attributiveness into the semantics .  
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2 .2 .  FC Readings 
In this subsection I will show that nothing more than we already have is required to 
account for the FC readings of ever FRs. In discussing FC readings there are two 
cases to consider. One in which genericity is at issue and another in which plurality 
i s  at play. Let us take FC readings dependent on genericity first. 
The standard way of deriving the difference between episodic and non­
episodic interpretations rests on whether the world variable is free, hence 
contextually anchored, or bound by a generic/temporal operator. Consider (3 1 a) ,  the 
generic counterpart of (27a) and compare its interpretation in (3 1 b) with (27b). 
Possibly, something smaller than worlds, namely situations, is needed but I will stick 
to worlds for purposes of demonstration here. The contextual variable C plays the 
standard role of restricting quantification to relevant occassions of Mary ' s  cooking: 
(3 1 )  a .  Whatever Mary cooks uses onions. 
b. Vw[C(w)] [Vi-alt E f(w)(s)[uses-onions(i)(lx[cooking(i )(x)(m)])]]  
The logical representation captures the FC flavor. The tense-aspect requires truth to 
be evaluated at all contextually relevant worlds/situations in which Mary cooks 
something. The assertion is stronger than a regular generic because ever forces 
evaluation at i-alternatives of every world, suggesting an essential connection 
between the description and the property it i s  asserted to have . 
This account ofFC readings of FRs makes them similar to generic statements 
with regular universals while maintaining a crucial distinction between them. In the 
former case, the additional modality introduced by ever forces the assertion to extend 
to i-alternatives of each generically bound world .  This predicts that FRs with a FC 
reading, but not generic universals, license counterfactual entailments : 
(32) a. Those days, Mary ate whatever Bil l  cooked . 
b. Vw[C(w)& th-days(w)] [Vi-alt E f(w)(s) [eat(i)(lx[cook(i)(x)(b)])(m)]] 
(33)  a .  Those days, Mary ate everything Bi l l  cooked. 
b.  Vw[C(w) & th-days(w)] [Vx [cook(w)(x)(b) � eat(w)(x)(m)]]  
So far we have considered cases of FRs with singular domains and shown 
how the attributive-only meaning of ever leads to identity readings with episodic 
tense and FC reading with non-episodic tense. Let us now turn to FRs with plural 
domains and episodic tense, cases I had not considered in  Dayal ( 1 995a) :  
(34) a. Mary cooked several dishes yesterday. Whatever she cooked had onions. 
b .  Vi-alt E f(w)(s) [have-onions(i)(lX[*cook(i)(x)(m)])] 
In this case, it is hard to unequivocally classifY the reading as idenity or Fe. This is 
in keeping with the view that there is no formal dichotomy between the two.9 
I have argued here that ever introduces a modal dimension into the 
interpretation of FRs by introducing a set of i-alternative worlds. A unified account 
of identity and FC readings was made possible by separating the quantification 
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associated with ever from the one required for the episodic/non-episodic distinction. 
3. The Facts Revisited 
3 . 1 .  The Chameleon-Like Character of Ever FRs 
The goal of this section is to re-examine the differences between plain and ever F Rs 
discussed in section 1 .2 and 1 . 3 from the viewpoint of the proposal about ever given 
in section 2 .  As we can see, the proposal has two distinct aspects. One, the type of 
modality it assigns to ever imposes (modal) universal quantification on what i s  
essentially a definite description. Two, the definition of i-alternative worlds is such 
that it resists ful l  specification about identity. As I will show, these two aspects of 
the analysis provide a way of handling the data that had earlier appeared problematic. 
Recall ,  first of all ,  Jacobson ' s  observation in (7) that ever FRs cannot be 
modified by nearly or almost whereas ordinary universal quantifiers can. In the 
present account the FR is a definite . The quantification over i-worlds introduced by 
ever does not provide a syntactic universal determiner that could be so modified. 
Consider next the facts about scope interaction with negation and the missing­
P constructions. Even though we have preserved the definite character of the FR, the 
modality introduced requires a shift to the generalized quantifier type. It is therefore 
expected that ever FRs will be subject to QR where it may interact with negation or 
affect copying and reconstruction. In the case of negation, for example, the speaker 
can assert the existence of some i-alternatives where the the plural entity Mary 
ordered is not l iked by John. She then adds that the actual world is such an i-world: 
(35)  a. John didn ' t  l ike whatever Mary ordered but he l iked most of i t .  
b .  �Vi-alt E f(w)(s)[l ike(i)(\x [order(i)(x)(m)])(j)] 
Regarding partitive readings, the account remains unchanged except that QR 
of ever FRs is forced due to type-mismatch. The collective reading wil l  require 
lambda conversion into the base position, yielding (36b). For the distributed partitive 
reading we distribute the property over the atoms as before . (3 6c) says that for al l  
i-alternatives, the property of being an x such that Mary read two thirds of i t  in i ,  
holds of  a l l  atomic parts of the books that are in the series in i :  
(36) a.  Mary read two thirds of whatever books are in the series. 
b. Vi-alt E f(w)(s) [read(i)(2/3 � \x[books(i)(x) & in-series(i)(x)])(m)] 
c .  Vi-alt E f(w)(s)[D,l..x[read(i)(2/3 � x)(m)](lx[books(i)(x) & in-series(i)(x)])] 
Let us tum now to Tredinnick's  observation that QVE and ever FRs are 
incompatible. The example is repeated in (3 8a). Before discussing the reasons for 
th is ,  note that her general ization is  not quite correct. (3 7a) shows that mostly does 
yicld a QVE reading when the FR is  individual -denoting and (39a) shows that an 
adverb of quantification like always (or never) is compatible with a FR referring to 
occassions. The translations they would have in the present account are also given : 
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(37) a. People mostly/usually honor whoever is elected. 
b. 
(38)  a .  
b. 
MOSTo[C( 0 )] [Vi-alt E f( 0 )(s) [honor(i)(lx[be-elected(i)(x)])(people)] ]  
Whenever Mary goes to the store, she mostly buys potatoes. 





Whenever Mary goes to the store, she always buys potatoes. 
ALLo [c(o)] [Vi-alt E f(o)(s) [buy(i)(p)(m)]] 
a .  b .  c .  
M goes to  S :  01 
M buys P: T 
O2 
T 
Although the facts appear bewildering, an explanation for them is available 
in the present account. Let us take (37) first. Here mostly quantifies over 
contextually relevant occassions, that is ,  those maximal occassions with an elected 
officer in it . It asserts that in most such occasssions the elected official i s  honored 
and, further, that this is not contingent on the identity of the individual concerned. 
Turning to cases where the free relative itself denotes occassions, note that 
there is a complex interaction between binding of the occassion (or world) variable 
by the adverb and the universal quantification over i-alternatives imposed by ever. 
To see this, consider the scenarios in (40). In (40a) Mary buys potatoes on only one 
out of three occassions, in (40b) in two out of three and in (40c) in all three. Now, 
(3 8b) will be evaluated false in (40a) as well  as (40b) because for each occassion, 
ever forces evaluation in all its i -alternatives. But the set of i-alternatives for any 
occassion is { 0 , ,02,03 }  and the fact that Mary doesn't  buy potatoes a t  03 i s  sufficient 
to make the statement false. The only scenario that is  predicted to be compatib le  
with QVE is  the third one since the requirements of the adverb and ever coincide. 
This is what (3 9) expresses. Note that QVE is also predicted with never, since it i s  
another determiner that requires every occassion to have the same truth value. 
Finally, let us consider the fact that plain FRs do not license polarity items 
while ever FRs do. The plain FR, being a definite, is not downward entailing. Thus 
(4 l a) may be true but (4 1 b) will be undefined if Bill cooks several things, but 
nothing wel l .  The evaluation of (42a) and (42b), however, is different in this context . 
[f Bil l  cooks nothing well ,  the definite description will be undefined and there wi l l  
be  no i-alternatives to  consider. Given a degenerate domain of quantification for the 
universal, (42b) will come out to vacuously true. In short, the modality imputed to 
ever endows the FR with properties that are crucial to polarity l icensing without 
making it a regular universal quantifier: 
(4 1 )  a .  Mary ate what Bi l l  cooked. 
b .  Mary ate what Bi l l  cooked well .  
(42 ) a. Mary ate whatever Bi l l  cooked . 
b. Mary ate whatever Bi l l  cooked well .  
3 . 2 .  The Constraint Against Full Specification 
I wil l  now tum to the fact that in  the present analysis of ever FRs ful l  knowledge 
about identity leads to degenerate domains of quantification, and show how it 
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explains their distribution in pseudoclefts. Recall Iatridou and Varlakosta ( 1 996) ' s 
observation that both types of FRs are acceptable in predicational pseudoclefts (43a) 
but only plain FRs are acceptable in specificational pseudoclefts (43b):  
(43) a. What(ever) Mary bought was expensive. 
b .  What(*ever) Mary bought was Barriers . 
c. What(?ever) Mary bought wasn't  Barriers . 
I&V explain the unacceptability of the ever FR in (43b) on the basis of two factors . 
One, the ever FR is a universal quantifier of type « e,t>t> and two, the FR in this 
structure must be the argument, not the functor. Given that the VP denotes 
something of type <e,t>, the two cannot combine. It remains unclear, of course, why 
the ever FR cannot QR, leaving behind a trace of the right type .  Another question 
that remains unexplained is why the structure improves when the copular i s  negated, 
as in (43c) .  Such sentences are sometimes considered unacceptable or marginal in 
the l iterature but Tredinnick ( 1 994) cites E. Prince as noting it  to be acceptable. 
Though the status of (43c) may be controversial, the contrast with (43b) i s  not. 
To see how these facts fol low under the present account from the constraint 
against full specification, consider the interpretation of the plain and ever versions 
of (43b) and the ever version of (43c): 
(44) a. h[x=b](w)(lX[buy(w)(x)(m)]) 
b. Vi-alt E f(w)(s)[h[x=b](i)(lx[buy(i)(x)(m)])] 
c .  Vi-alt E f(w)(s)[h[x * b](i)(lX[buy(i)(x)(m)])] 
(44a), the translation of the plain version of (43b) ,  simply identifies the thing Mary 
bought at w as Barriers. (44b), the translation of the ever version, says that this is so 
in all i -alternatives. We know, of course, that if the FR necessari ly denotes Barriers 
there remains no criteria for invoking i-alternatives . Now, (44c), the ever version 
of (43c), says that in all the i -alternatives the thing Mary bought i s something other 
than Barriers . The quantification is predicted to be fel icitous because it is stil l  
possible to invoke i-alternatives. The problem here , however, i s  that the sentence i s  
predicted to  be fully acceptable bu t  it is not. I assume this is  for syntactic reasons 
that are not well-understood at this time. Let me simply point out that the contrast 
between the ever versions of (43b) and (43c) i s  what the present account successful ly 
delivers and leave the explanation for the marginality of (43c) for another occassion. 
Another paradigm that that is  relevant in this connection i s  given in (45) :  
(45 ) a. Whatever Bil l  cooked was what Mary ate/the thing Mary ate . 
b. * Everything Bil l  cooked was what Mary ate/the thing Mary ate . 
The unacceptability of(45b) is expected under I&V's view that only referential terms 
can be in precopular position. They do not consider cases like (45a), however, which 
are fully acceptable, contrary to what they predict. Under the prcsent approach, (45a) 
is not problematic .  If the speaker does not know the identity of the obj ect denoted 
by the post-copular definite description, i-alternatives can be invoked. The speaker 
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simply asserts that there is a correlation between what Bi l l  cooked and what Mary 
ate, whether it be pasta or rice or steak . 
Finally, universals align with plain FRs, not ever FRs, in adjunct structures :  1 0  
(46) *WhatJ*Everything Mary bought it was not Barriers. 
(47) a. Whatever Mary bought it was not Barriers . 
b. Vi-alt E f(w)(s) [3x[x=\y[buy(i)(y)(m)] (i)]]  [\y[buy(i)(y)(m)] .. b(i)] 
One way to interpret (47a) would be to treat it as a quantificational structure along 
the l ines of correlatives. But languages l ike Hindi that instantiate such structures do 
not distinguish between plain and ever versions of the relative clause . Following a 
suggestion by Masaaki Fuj i  (p.c . ) ,  I wil l  therefore treat such structures as syntactic 
adj uncts with a conditional meaning. However, I will try to derive that meaning on 
the basis of what I have proposed for ever FRs in the general case. 
Since ever introduces a set of worlds into the interpretion procedure, I suggest 
that in addition to yielding generalized quantifier meanings it also yields conditional 
meanings ApAqVi-altEf(w)(s)[P(i)�q(i)J, where the antecedent is trivially derived by 
existentially quantifying in the property of being the unique object Mary bought and 
the pronoun in the matrix interpreted as E-type or dynamically bound by the 
existentia l .  (47a) says that every i-aJt world is such that if Mary bought a unique 
obj ect in it, that object is not Barriers in that world .  Note that adjunct structures are 
unable to redeem affirmative statements such as (43a), as predicted under the present 
approach. Note also that the sentences in (46), lacking the modal dimension, are not 
expected to have conditional meanings. 
An advantage of this approach that may be worth mentioning here is that it 
readily extends to another well-documented fact about ever FRs in adjunct structures. 
Unlike plain FRs or regular universals, they need not be l inked to arguments in the 
main clause: 
(48)  a. Whatever Mary bought, John was happy. 
b. * What/*Everything Mary bought, John was happy. 
Treating ever FRs in adjunct structures as involving quantification over worlds is not 
particularly radical but by relating it to their semantics in general ,  I have attempted 
a more economical explanation for distinct but obviously related phenomena. 
To conclude, I have argued in this paper that plain and ever FRs are definites. 
I have also argued that there is no formal distinction between identity and Fe 
readings of ever FRs. Ever uniformly contributes a modal dimension to the 
interpretation of the definite description by ensuring that it denotes a generalized 
quantifier that includes only those properties that are true of the bearer, regardless of 
identity. And I have shown how the particulars of the analysis can be used to explain 
facts that have been standardly taken to argue against treating ever FR as a definites. 
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\ . Jacobson ( 1 995) and Dayal ( 1 995a) draw on earl ier work. Jacobson' s  ideas were 
presented at the 1 989 LSA Meeting. Mine grew out of my 1 99 1  dissertation on 
Hindi wh dependencies; the ( 1 995) article focuses on the issues relevant here . 
2 . In Dayal ( 1 995a) I did not consider the contribution of bhii when the domain is  
plural and the tense non-episodic, as in (6).  I discuss such cases in section 2 .  
3 .  The plain FR in ( l 5a) is of type e but presumably can shift to  « et>t> or the 
functor-argument restriction can be relaxed in predicational pseudoclefts. 
4 .  Larson' s  original example has a singular internal head, but note that the 
coresponding plain FR is unacceptable with or without the preposition */ will live in 
what town you will live (in) (P. Jacobson, p.c .) .  Since plural internal heads are more 
acceptable in plain FRs Larson 's  arguments could sti l l  go through. But see Grosu 
( 1 996) for arguments against Larson' s  account of missing-P FRs. 
5 .  If  QR to IP is licit , we would have another derivation with a semantics identical 
to (20b). The unambiguity of ( 1 8a) would stil l  be derived. 
6. It is  hard to get a clear identity reading with items like any, which is important for 
the point I 'm trying to make. Note also that although the hell is easily available in 
questions, ever is needed to l icense it in FRs. 
7 .  Jacobson ( 1 995) points out that it is unclear whether FRs really have existence 
presuppositions. In fact, i t  turns out that existence presuppositions for F Rs with 
which are stronger than for FRs with what, a topic I cannot address here. 
S Recall that i-alternatives are speaker oriented and reflect the speakers (lack of) 
knowledge of the world, not actual different worlds. No adj ustment in the theory of 
names as rigid designators is  needed. 
4 A potential problem for the present approach arises with plural domains in 
discourses like the following: John cooked ratatouille and goulash. They both had 
onions. Therefore we can say that whatever John cooked had onions. One might 
argue that since the speaker has beliefs about the identity of the dishes cooked by 
John, i-alternatives could not be invoked. On the other hand, it may possibilc  to 
individuate i-alternatives on the basis of parts of a plural entity. 
1 0. These structures must be read without an intonation break between the FR and 
the matrix. Plain FRs are acceptable with a pause, as left dislocation structures .  
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